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Equity For Punks: Conceptual issues with public protections in offerings of shares to the public 
Dr Jonathan Hardman* 
1. Introduction 
On 9 September 2020, popular drinks manufacturer BrewDog plc1 published a prospectus2 to offer 
shares to the public, known as BrewDog’s “Equity for Punks Tomorrow”. This scheme is a retail 
offering allowing individuals to subscribe for “B shares” in the capital of BrewDog plc.3 This is the 
sixth time that BrewDog have offered such shares for the public, following previously successful 
“Equity for Punks” raises.4 The offer is to subscribe for shares in BrewDog. Shares are normally said 
 
*Lecturer in International Commercial Law, Edinburgh Law School. The author is grateful to Professors David 
Cabrelli and Irene-marie Esser, and Dr Alisdair MacPherson, for their helpful comments on previous versions of 
the ideas expressed in this article. All errors, omissions, and weakness in argument remain the sole responsibility of 
the author.  
1 BrewDog plc is a Scottish company (with registered number SC511560). General received wisdom is that the 
substance of Scots company law overlaps with English company law – N Grier, Company Law, 5th edn (W Green, 
2020) at para 1-29.  
2 Available at 
https://downloads.ctfassets.net/b0qgo9rl751g/ETxSoJgJiHcEWDU1bMipw/54212768f0386338974e502a99abc38
4/13104_-_EFP_Prospectus__Summary_and_Registration_Document__Spreads_.pdf. 
3 Ibid, Securities Note p 3. 
4 https://www.brewdog.com/uk/community/culture/our-history. 
to have three key entitlements5: the right to a dividend,6 the right to vote,7 and the right to a residual 
claim on the company’s surplus.8 In exchange for these entitlements, shareholders are paid out last in 
the corporate waterfall,9 and there are restrictions about when shareholders can withdraw their funds.10   
For private companies, these entitlements are frequently varied,11 and so it is not unusual to see shares 
in private companies with no dividend rights, no voting rights, and/or no rights to a residual claim. In 
addition, it is usual in private companies to restrict the free transfer of shares.12 We explore the extent 
to which the BrewDog shares offered to the public contain these rights and other features. We argue 
that the entitlements attached to the shares on offer are lower than they would be if the offer to the 
 
5 See PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th ed, 2016), para 
23-4, G Morse et al, Palmer’s Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, Release 168, 2020) para 6-009. See also discussion in 
MJ Whincop, ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’ (1999) 19 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19 applies this concept to interactions between the directors and the company. S. 
Worthington, ‘Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement (Part I)’ (2001) 22 The Company Lawyer 
258; S Worthington, ‘Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement (Part II)’ (2001) 22 The Company 
Lawyer 307. 
6 For the economic case, see DJH Greenwood, ‘The Dividend Puzzle: Are Shares Entitled to the Residual?’ (2006) 
32 Journal of Corporation Law 103. 
7 For a theoretical discussion, see H.G. Manne, ‘Some Theoretical Aspects of Shareholder Voting: An Essay in 
Honor of Adolfe A Berle’ (1964) 64 Columbia Law Review 1427. 
8 The normative case for other features are often predicated upon this feature – e.g. FH Easterbrook and DR 
Fischel, ‘Voting in Corporate Law’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395. 
9 Insolvency Act 1986, s107. 
10 E.g. restrictions on dividends in Companies Act 2006, s831, and restrictions on redeeming shares in Companies 
Act 2006 s658. 
11 MA. Pickering, ‘The Problem of the Preference Share’ (1968) 26 Modern Law Review 499; WW Bratton and ML 
Wachter, ‘A Theory of Preferred Stock’ (2013) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1815. 
12 E.g. In Re Cawley & Co (1889) 42 Ch. D. 209; Charles Forte Investments Ltd v Amanda [1964] Ch. 240. 
public was coupled with a public listing on the London Stock Exchange. Accordingly, we argue that 
we need to re-balance protections provided across company law and capital markets law. 
This article proceeds as follows. Part 2 reviews the difference between an offer to the public and a 
public listing of shares. Part 3 explores the terms of BrewDog’s offer. Part 4 looks at other equity raises 
which have relied so heavily on branding features. Part 5 concludes.  
 
2. Offers to Public 
When a company raises external equity finance, as BrewDog are, they face additional restrictions than 
if equity raising from connected parties. This is because additional policy implications apply – 
lawmakers try to protect both potential investees13 and retain confidence and efficiency in the public 
market as a whole.14 First, there are restrictions that apply when a company offers its shares to the 
public – a wide definition which includes communicating sufficient information about an offer to 
enable an investor to decide to purchase shares.15 Private companies cannot offer shares to the public, 
and so the company must be (or in good faith be in the process of becoming) a public company prior 
to doing so.16 Being a public company brings automatic protections for its shareholders compared to 
being a private company, including: directors can only approve situational conflicts of interest if the 
 
13 See L Gullifer and J Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy (Hart, 2020, 3rd edn), Ch 10. 
14 See N Moloney, ‘Confidence and Competence: The Conundrum of EC Capital Markets Law’ (2004) 4 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 1. 
15 Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to 
be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and repealing 
Directive 2003/71/EC, reg 2(d). See discussion in L Enriques and TH Troger, ‘Issuer choice in Europe’ (2008) 67 
Cambridge Law Journal 521.  
16 Companies Act 2006, s755(1). The Companies Act definition of an offer to the public is not quite identical to the 
EU Regulation definition (see Companies Act 2006, s756(1). Morse et al, n 5 above, para 8-53. 
articles specifically allow it17; public accounts have to be filed within a shorter time period of the end 
of the financial period for public companies than private companies,18 reducing the chance that 
investment decisions are made on older information19; the Takeover Code applies to public companies 
(whether or not their shares are listed),20 triggering (amongst other things) mandatory bids if a 30 per 
cent shareholder threshold is exceeded21; public companies cannot make quasi-loans to directors22; and 
public companies must have annual general meetings.23 As such, shareholders in public companies have 
higher protections than in private companies. These apply regardless of the entitlements enjoyed by 
specific shares. To make an offer to the public, the company must issue a prospectus24 which must be 
approved by the FCA. Certain details must be included in this prospectus. The prospectus must contain 
sufficient detail to enable an investor to make an informed investment decision.25 These include specific 
 
17 Whereas in modern private companies, directors can authorise any such conflict unless there is a prohibition in 
the articles – see Companies Act 2006, s175; J Hardman, ‘The Companies Act 2006: It’s Time to Complete the 
Transition’ (2020) 41 The Company Lawyer 93. 
18 Companies Act 2006, s442. 
19 This may be a losing battle - SJ Grossman and J Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets’ (1980) 70 American Economic Review 393. It is also only of any use if there is an actual ability to exit – 
therefore is of limited use if shares are not, actually, listed on the public market. 
20 See Companies Act 2006, Part 28; G Morse ‘Assessing the impact of the Takeover Panel’s Code Committee – 
Code Reform Institutionalised?’ [2003] Journal of Business Law 314. 
21 Takeover Code (available at https://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf?v=7Nov2019), D3 Rule 2.2. 
22 Companies Act 2006, s198. 
23 Companies Act 2006, s336. 
24 Gullifer and Payne, n 13 above, ch 10.5. 
25 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s87A. 
risk factors,26 the financial condition of the company,27 senior management and their remuneration.28 
There is a requirement to outline historic dividend performance, and the company’s dividend policy.29 
This provides ex ante clarity to potential investors as to what their financial entitlements are likely to 
be when taking up an offer to the public. Accordingly, merely offering your shares to the public does 
not provide any restraint on the general ability to adjust entitlements attaching to shares: they can still 
be as freely adjusted as in private companies. 
 Second, the majority of UK companies30 who make offers to the public do so to be able to list 
their shares on the London Stock Exchange.31 In the same way that not all UK companies are listed on 
the LSE, not all companies whose shares are listed on the LSE are UK companies.32 There can be no 
restriction upon transfer of shares which are admitted to the main market of the LSE,33 and the 
platform itself provides a market for the transfer of shares, and therefore a liquid exit for investors.34 
 
26 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980 of 14 March 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the format, content, scrutiny and approval of the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004, Annex 1, Section 3. 
27 Ibid, Annex 1, Section 7.1 
28 Ibid, Annex 1, Sections 12 and 13. 
29 Ibid, Annex 1, Section 18.5; M Gutiérrez and M Sáez Lacave, ‘Strong shareholders, weak outside investors’ (2018) 
18 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 277. 
30 Gullifer and Payne, n 13 above, ch 10.3.3. 
31 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 285, and the FCA’s recognised investment exchange register - 
https://register.fca.org.uk/s/search?predefined=RIE. Here, we assume that all listings are main market listings. The 
LSE also runs an alternative investment market, which has lower levels of regulation.  
32 I MacNeil and A Lau, ‘International Corporate Regulation: Listing Rules and Overseas Companies’ (2001) 50 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 787; BR Cheffins, ‘The Undermining of UK Corporate 
Governance(?)’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 503. 
33 Listing Rules, rule 2.2. 
34 Listing Rules, rule 14.2.2. 
The listing rules provide that all equity shares of those companies admitted to the premium list of the 
main market35 must have equal rights to voting.36 In addition, empirical evidence suggests that the 
public market provides a premium to voting rights – implying that even if capital market rules did not 
require shares to obtain voting rights, market pressure would provide shares with voting entitlements 
where listed on capital markets.37 Given that the price of securities is set by the market,38 there is 
considerable pressure to provide a dividend stream to shareholders.39 A raft of further protections also 
apply to those companies whose shares are admitted to the LSE.40  
For our purposes, admission to the main market of the LSE provides certain legal and market 
driven characteristics to an investment which may not automatically be present in any particular share 
 
35 Listing Rules, rule 1.5.1G(4). 
36 Listing Rules, rule 7.2.1A. 
37 M Bigelli and E Croci, ‘Am I right or am I right? Dividend privileges and the value of voting rights’ (2011) ECGI 
Finance Working Paper 312/2011. 
38 They are initially set by bookbuilders who gauge what the market price is likely to be – see TJ Jenkinson and H 
Jones, ‘Bids and Allocations in European IPO Bookbuilding’ (2004) 59 Journal of Finance 2309. The price then 
normally rises after IPO – see K. Rock, ‘Why New Issues are Underpriced’ (1986) 15 Journal of Financial 
Economics 187. 
39 DR Fischel, ‘The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy’ (1981) 67 Virginia Law Review 699; HK Baker and 
R.Weigand, ‘Corporate Dividend Policy Revisited’ (2015) 41 Managerial Finance 126; V Brudney, ‘Dividends, 
Discretion and Disclosure’ (1980) 66 Virginia Law Review 85; F Black, ‘The Dividend Puzzle’ (1976) 2 Journal of 
Portfolio Management 5. 
40 In addition to the benefits outlined above, there are corporate governance protections afforded under the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, available at https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-
d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.pdf, required under the listing rules (Listing Rules, 
rule 9.8.6) which, amongst other things, requires independent directors, which has the effect of lowering agency 
costs - M Gutierrez and M Saez, ‘Deconstructing Independent Directors’ (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 63; W-G Ringe, ‘Independent Directors: After the Crisis’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law 
Review 401; F Song and AV Thakor, ‘Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance’ (2006) 61 
Journal of Corporate Finance 1845. 
in a private company: a vote, a dividend, and an ability to exit your investment on a liquid market at a 
price set by the capital market as a whole. Indeed, it has been argued that the mere fact that the share 
is said to be ‘owned’ by a shareholder arises due to pressure from capital markets.41 As a result, a share 
only inherently enjoys these features if it is listed on the LSE main market. This is often implicit in the 
literature: statements about rights attaching to shares often rely on a public market, whether such 
statement is normative42 or descriptive.43 BrewDog’s offer is one to the public, but without a 
corresponding listing. It therefore falls between the two usual extreme paradigms – it is neither an offer 
to corporate insiders (who are expected to be fully cognisant of all risks for their investment), or an 
offer to the public on the capital market (which contains full legal and market protections to potential 
investees).44 
 
3. BrewDog’s Offer 
 
 
41 IH Chiu, ‘The Meaning of Share Ownership and the Governance Role of Shareholder Activism in the United 
Kingdom’ (2008) 8 Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business 117, 120. 
42 E.g. RC Nolan, ‘Shareholder Rights in Britain’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 549, 570; P 
Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 32; MT Moore, 
‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism’ (2014) 34 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 693. 
43 E.g. Greenwood, n 6 above, 116-123; Bigelli and Croci, n 37 above; Chiu n 41 above, 91, are each predicated 
upon a public market. 
44 Compare Gutiérrez and Sáez Lacave, n 29 above (arguing the need to protect minority investors in respect of a 
public company) with FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, ‘Close Companies and Agency Costs’ (1986) 38 Stanford 
Law Review 271 (arguing that close company minorities protect themselves). 
BrewDog’s 2015 equity raise valued the company at over £300m – 116 times its annual profit.45 This 
raise was successful.46 BrewDog has three share classes: management hold ‘A shares’m with “key 
members” of management together holding 52.07%.47 An institutional investor holds a combination of 
A Shares and ‘preferred C shares’, giving them 23%.48 This means that these key management and the 
institutional investor between them hold more than 75% of the nominal value of the shares of 
BrewDog. 
BrewDog’s offer relates to ‘B shares’, the same class that it has issued to the public previously, which 
have a nominal value of £0.001, at a price of £25.15 per share.49 It has long been noted that nominal 
value is entirely disconnected from the market value of shares, and as such may be actively misleading 
in the case of equity raising such as this.50 In this case, this means that the amount subscribed for in 
each share which is actually relevant for the calculation of entitlements is one 25,150th of the amount 
that the investor is paying. The equity raise is intended to raise £7.5m, but the directors can expand 
this to £50m in their sole discretion.51 Were £50m to be raised, this would relate to 2.7% of the 
company’s capital.52 If all shares are valued equally, this values the company at just over £1.8 billion. 
 
45 https://www.ft.com/content/adb4daa6-e9dd-11e4-a687-00144feab7de/. 
46 It issued 171,666 B shares (each with a nominal value of £0.001) at a price of £23.75 per share, raising over £4m, 
per a form SH01 return on allotment of shares filed with the Registrar of Companies on 16 July 2018 – available at 
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/SC311560/filing-history. Other similar 
returns imply that several tranches were issued as part of this fund raise. All information about the share capital of 
BrewDog is taken from the Prospectus and/or publicly filed information available up to 30 January 2020.  
47 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 3. 
48 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Summary Document 3. 
49 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 2. 
50 See J Armour, ‘Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 5; E 
Ferran, ‘Revisiting Legal capital’ (2019) 20 European Business Organization Law Review 521; J Rickford, 
‘Reforming capital’ (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 919. 
51 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 2. 
52 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 37. 
The prospectus states that BrewDog’s earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation in 
2019 was £17m,53 valuing the company at a multiple in excess of 100 times such EBITDA. The value 
of a company is, of course, based on future expectations in addition to current performance.54 Where 
shares are publicly listed, this can be tested by reference to the market price.55 BrewDog’s shares are 
not publicly listed. Without such a public market, each investor has to establish the likelihood of their 
return exceeding their investment. This is generally estimated by the rough heuristic of multiplying 
some measure of profit by a multiple established by looking at comparable companies.56 By way of 
comparators, in 2020, US breweries generally were valued between 10 and 35 times their EBITDA,57 
 
53 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 11. The prospectus does not include a breakdown of this 
EBITDA, nor any calculation to justify it. 
54 This is a simple proposition with many subtle variants that are irrelevant for our purposes – for the importance of 
dividends see MJ Gordon, ‘Dividends, Earnings and Stock Prices’ (1959) 41 Review of Economics and Statistics 99; 
F Modigliani and MH Miller, ‘Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction’ (1963) 53 American 
Economic Review 261. For the CAPM discussion, see WF Share, ‘Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk’ (1964) 19 Journal of Finance 425; J Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets 
and the Selection of Risky Investments (1965) 47 Review of Economics and Statistics 13.  
55 At least, in a well-functioning capital market – WH Beaver, ‘Market Efficiency’ (1981) 56 The Accounting Review 
23; LA Stout, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance’ (2003) 28 
Journal of Corporation Law 635. 
56 M Kim and JR Ritter, ‘Valuing IPOs’ (1999) 54 Journal of Financial Economics 409; LE DeAngelo, ‘Equity 
Valuation and Corporate Control’ (1990) 65 The Accounting Review 93. This is a very rough valuation tool – see S. 
Imam, R. Barker and C. Clubb, ‘The Use of Valuation Models by UK Investment Analysts’ (2011) 17 European 
Accounting Review 503. This is caused, at least in part, by the difficulty in identifying suitable comparators – see S 
Bhojraj and C Lee, ‘Who is my peer? A valuation-based approach to the selection of comparable firms’ (2002) 40 
Journal of Accounting Research 407. 
57 https://www.mossadams.com/articles/2020/06/q2-2020-brewery-trends , with an average of 15.54 over 2019 
according to research attributed to New York University - https://www.equidam.com/ebitda-multiples-trbc-
industries/. 
with it being thought that UK brewery multiples were generally at the bottom end of that range.58 This 
is a legal article only, but it seems that there may be reasons to consider that BrewDog’s self-valuation 
may be ambitious. Indeed, the company has issued options over 1,455,668 A shares (which would 
constitute c1.978%) with strike prices59 at a range between £0.14 and £5.00 per share60 – considerably 
lower than the £25.15 requested per B share on offer. Extrapolating from the most recent statement 
of share capital prior to the prospectus launch,61 this would mean that, if the new offer were taken up 
entirely and all options exercised, then the total B shares, being all of those ever offered to the public, 
would represent approximately 20.29%, leaving A shares and C shares (those held by management, 
employees and the institutional shareholders) representing nearly 80%.  
BrewDog’s shares are not listed on a public exchange, restricting both retail investor exit and lowering 
the protective regulation in place. As B shareholders together will own less than 25% of voting rights, 
retail investors lack even negative control to block special resolutions.62 BrewDog’s prospectus is clear 
as to the limited rights obtained by shareholders – of its nine reasons for investing, six relate to 
enhanced purchasing rights of, or discounts in, BrewDog products,63 one relates to a tree being planted 
in BrewDog’s forest, and the final two are owning a part of BrewDog and receiving an invite to the 




59 See discussion in P Geiler and L Renneboog, ‘Managerial Compensation: Agency Solution or Problem?’ (2011) 11 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 99. 
60 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Registration Document 13. See discussion of share options in entrepreneurship 
in O Maynard and W Bains, ‘Share Structure and Entrepreneurship in UK Biotechnology Companies: An Empirical 
Study’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1. 
61 Filed on 30 January 2020 - https://find-and-update.company-
information.service.gov.uk/company/SC311560/filing-history?page=1. 
62 See discussion in V Joffe, ‘Majority Rule Undermined?’ (1977) 40 Modern Law Review 71. 
63 These rights increase the larger the shareholder’s investment is. 
of Equity Punks and the lowdown on all things BrewDog.’64 Hardly the hallmarks of a traditional 
AGM.65 Indeed, BrewDog’s offer is hardly representative of the typical dry prospectus providing 
financial reasons for a rational investor to invest.66 Offers to the public are usually assumed to be 
coupled with listings,67 but there are challenges to this usual approach. Recently, Spotify listed its shares 
in New York, but through a ‘direct listing’ – the company submitting to capital markets rules but not 
issuing new shares. BrewDog’s offer is the opposite of this – it offered shares to the public but without 
submitting to the capital market. Accordingly, not only are legal protections offered by capital markets 
law not available, the disciplinary effect of the market is also not available. Let us review the three key 
entitlements that are said to attach to shares in turn. Ostensibly the shares in the offer have pari passu 
rights with all other shares issued,68 but the reality is more nuanced. 
First, dividends. BrewDog pays a portion of its profits each year to its own charity.69 This 
dedication to philanthropic giving is admirable,70 but arguably stretches the corporate form: which in 
 
64 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 25. 
65 See E Micheler, ‘Facilitating investor engagement and stewardship’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization 
Law Review 29. 
66 Prospectuses have, historically, been generally criticised for containing too much financial information – H 
Kripke, ‘The SEC, the accountants, some myths and some realities’ (1970) New York University Law Review 1151 – 
making them incomprehensible to laymen – H Kripke, ‘The Myth of the Informed Layman’ (1973) 28 The Business 
Lawyer 631. 
67 Gullifer and Payne, n 13 above, ch 10.3.3. 
68 BrewDog’s articles of association, filed on 10 November 2020, available at https://find-and-update.company-
information.service.gov.uk/company/SC311560/filing-history. Article 6.1. 
69 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 3. 
70 See B Sjåfjell ‘Beyond Climate Risk: Integrating Sustainability into the Duties of the Corporate Board’ (2018) 23 
Deakin Law Review 41; A.L. Christie, ‘The new hedge fund activism: Activist directors and the market for corporate 
quasi-control’ (2019) 19 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1. 
the US has required interests of shareholders to be considered first71 and in the UK requires directors 
to consider the interests of the shareholders as paramount, despite rhetoric that hints at the contrary.72 
BrewDog also pays 10% of profits as an annual bonus to staff without any mention of their individual 
performances.73 In the financial year ending 31 December 2019, the board of directors received £1m 
total remuneration,74 the same as the entire net profit of the company for that year.75 Therefore, its 
profit is mostly paid to charitable foundations and to staff and management. Its policy is not to pay 
dividends to shareholders.76 As noted above, if this offer to the public were coupled with a listing on a 
capital market, the capital market would likely apply pressure for a dividend. 
Second, return on capital. On a winding up or any public listing, C shareholders are paid first, 
receiving the price of their investment plus a compounding 18% per annum.77 This would mean that 
the holders of C shares would receive in excess of the first £400m on any exit.78 Funds are then to be 
 
71 JR Macey, ‘A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v Ford’ (2008) 3 Virginia Law and Business 
Review 177.  
72 Companies Act 2006, s172, as discussed in A. Keay, ‘Tackling the issue of the corporate objective: an analysis of 
the United Kingdom’s ‘enlightened shareholder value approach’’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 577; A Keay and T 
Iqbal, ‘The Impact of Enlightened Shareholder Value’ [2019] Journal of Business Law 304. The UK has a history of 
requiring directors to consider the interests of shareholders – see Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch. 927, as discussed 
in L Sealy, ‘Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform’ in D. Feldman and F. Meisel (eds) Corporate and 
Commercial Law: Modern Developments (Lloyd’s of London Press, 1996), 27. 
73 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note, 3. 
74 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Registration Document 12. 
75 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Registration Document 24. 
76 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 3. 
77 BrewDog’s articles of association, n 68 above, article 6.2. 
78 This is based on a few assumptions. 8,383,915 existing shares were redesignated as C shares on 29 March 2017 
(see form SH08 filed on 26 June 2017 - https://find-and-update.company-
information.service.gov.uk/company/SC311560/filing-history) and a statement of capital filed on 7 June 2017 states 
7,776,934 C shares were issued on 6 April 2017 at a price of £13.18 per C share (https://find-and-update.company-
split pari passu between A and B shareholders.79 Directors retain the discretion to refuse any transfer by 
a B shareholder.80 This is usual in private companies,81 and can trace its lineage directly to the Bubble 
Act of 1720.82 Accordingly, exit is not guaranteed. BrewDog open their own online platform 
periodically for B shareholders to trade through – such platform charges 3 per cent of the transaction 
price to each of the purchaser and the seller.83 BrewDog is a plc and therefore subject to the Takeover 
Code,84 and as such should a party acquire over 30 per cent of the shares in the capital of BrewDog 
then there will need to be a mandatory bid for all shares.85 This may result in the B shareholders having 
 
information.service.gov.uk/company/SC311560/filing-history). Public filings do not make it clear when the 
redesignated shares were issued or for what price. However, if we assume that all C shares reflected in the 30 
Janaury 2020 statement of capital were issued at a price of £13.18 per share on 6 April 2017, then the total price of 
the C share investment is over £200m, plus cumulative interest at 18 per cent per annum - if that assumption was 
correct and an exit takes place on 6 April 2021, then the C shareholder will receive the first £412,959,643 of any 
shareholder equity. If this takes place on 7 April 2022 then the C shareholders will receive the first c£487m, and if it 
takes place on 7 April 2023, then the C shareholders will receive £575m. As BrewDog states that it believes in 
independence from ‘multi-national conglomerates controlled by faceless accountants and balance sheets’ - 
https://www.brewdog.com/uk/community/brewdog-believe - it seems unlikely that any exit is planned in the short 
term. 
79 BrewDog’s articles of association, n 68 above, article 6.2.2. As there were already 57,063,176 A and B shares in 
issue prior to the new issue (see form SH01 filed on 30 January 2020 - https://find-and-update.company-
information.service.gov.uk/company/SC311560/filing-history) if the new share issue is taken in full then the total 
number of A and B shares in issue will be 59,051,247. For these to be paid at the price currently being paid for, the 
exit needs to take place at £1.8bn. 
80 BrewDog’s articles of association, n 68 above, article 37.1. 
81 J Hardman, ‘Articles of Association in UK Private Companies: An Empirical Leximetric Study’ (forthcoming 
2021) European Business Organization Law Review. 
82 See R Harris, Industrialising English Law – Entrepreneurship and Business Organization 1720-1844 (CUP, 200) 289. 
83 BrewDog Prospectus, n 2 above, Securities Note 37. 
84 N 11 above. 
85 This is also reflected in the articles BrewDog articles of association, n 68 above, article 41. 
an ability to exit, but it will not be in their control. As such, in addition to having a large payment due 
before they obtain any entitlement, B shareholders cannot be said to have any ability to sell their shares. 
If this offer to the public were coupled with a listing, they would be able to know the market value of 
their investment at any time, and be able to freely sell their shares on such market. 
Third, voting. All BrewDog shares have equal entitlements as to voting.86 However, two important 
limitations apply. First, the A shares and C shares will hold, between them, over 75% of votes. They 
can therefore pass any resolutions that they like. They cannot remove any rights from the B 
shareholders, but they can interfere with the enjoyment of those rights87 - for example by issuing more 
shares. Second, all powers of the company sit with the board.88 This includes an unlimited borrowing 
power89 - whereas normally there are limitations on such borrowing powers for publicly traded 
companies90 which provides further protections to shareholders that directors will not unilaterally 
increase debt of the company. This is lacking in the BrewDog offer – directors can do what they would 
like, and in any matter that requires shareholder decisions, management and the institutional investor 
can make them.  
Accordingly, subscribing for BrewDog’s Equity for Punks Tomorrow scheme will provide you 
with no income, no control to direct the exit of your investment, and without a meaningful voice. The 
latter is, of course, a usual consequence of obtaining a minority stake in any company.91 However, 
 
86 BrewDog’s articles of association, n 68 above, article 6. 
87 White v Bristol Aeroplane [1953] 2 WLR 144. 
88 BrewDog’s articles of association, n 68 above, article 89. 
89 BrewDog’s articles of association, n 68 above, article 95. 
90 Most institutional shareholder bodies state that public companies should have limits on their borrowing – such as 
the Association of British Insurers (https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5881/Articles-of-Association.pdf, 1); the 
Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (https://www.plsa.co.uk/Portals/0/Documents/Policy-
Documents/2020/PLSA-Stewardship-Guide-and-Voting-Guidelines-180220.pdf, 26). 
91 RJ Gilson, ‘Controlling shareholders and corporate governance: Complicating the comparative taxonomy’ (2005) 
119 Harvard Law Review 1641. 
protections would exist for investors in BrewDog if it were publicly listed: there would be governance 
requirements as to how corporate decisions were made,92 requirements that dominant shareholders 
enter into agreements to limit their influence.93 In addition, if the shares were listed on the main market 
of the UK’s public exchange, then at least 25% of equity shares would be listed,94 and each equity share 
would be linked to a corresponding voting right.95 This means those shares listed on the capital market 
would, collectively, enjoy the negative power to block special resolutions. Investors would also be able 
to exit on the market freely, and market prices would dictate the price of future offer levels. Given that 
B shareholders cannot freely exit BrewDog, it seems surprising that law provides potential investors 
with fewer legal protections than it would were a public market involved - when it appears that potential 
BrewDog customers would require even more. Existing theoretical approaches either proceed on the 
basis that potential shareholders are insiders, able to exert some form of power over the (normally 
close) company, or purely external shareholders who can exit if the company is being run a way contrary 
to their interests. Protections are provided accordingly.96 BrewDog shows us that there is a middle 
ground, grey area – and shareholders in this grey area have fewer legal or market protections than 




92 Afforded by the UK Corporate Governance Code, n 40 above. 
93 Listing Rules, Rule 6.5.4. See discussion in PL Davies, ‘Related Party Transactions: the UK Model’ in L Enriques 
and TH Tröger (eds) The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 395-398; A 
Engert and T Florstedt, ‘Which related party transactions should be subject to ex ante review? Evidence from 
Germany’ (2020) 20 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 263. 
94 Listing Rules, rule 6.14.2. 
95 Listing Rules, rule 7.2.1A. 
96 Very few protections are afforded to potential investors in private companies when compared to the obligations 
to disclose information for an offer to the public and the listing rules. 
BrewDog’s share offer is clearly strongly linked to its branding – implicit in the name of the offer,97 
throughout its prospectus98 and even throughout its articles, which in addition to the general power of 
directors to refuse to transfer shares contains a superfluous proclamation that the board may refuse to 
register the transfer of a share to any “monolithic purveyor of bland industrial beer”.99 The use of 
branding in corporate transactions has been noted before. Fleischer noted that a series of US companies 
made ostensibly illogical choices due to branding implications – Google’s 2004 public offering was 
done by way of internet auction rather than more traditional means, Ben & Jerry’s only sold its shares 
to Vermont residents when it went public in 1984, Steve Jobs’ contract with Apple only gave him an 
annual salary of $1, and Stanley Works decided against the financially sensible decision to reincorporate 
in Bermuda, and instead stayed in Connecticut where its taxes were higher – in each case because it 
made sense for the company to maximise its branding impact.100 However, the public ultimately 
received uniform instruments for each of these companies - a typical share offered to the public on a 
listed exchange with the stereotypical entitlement attaching to a share. Each of these companies made 
a decision to increase branding to ultimately maximise value to shareholders. BrewDog’s offering 
instead pushes the boundaries of a publicly owned share by removing the majority of financial rights. 
The majority of benefits that BrewDog states it offers relate to, ultimately, discounts for the purchase 
of BrewDog products.101 It is therefore offering an entirely unknown (and uncontrollable) return 
combined with a loyalty card. Under the UK regime, this offer needs less regulation than a usual offer 
of shares to the public which is coupled with a listing of shares on LSE. Perhaps we need to rethink 
whether this is the correct balance for our legal system to deploy. Nothing in this article is intended as 
a critique of BrewDog – they have offered a popular product for purchase entirely within the legal 
 
97 BrewDog’s first and headline beer was “Punk IPA” - https://www.brewdog.com/uk/punk-ipa-4-x-can, which 
links strongly to the “Equity for Punks” branding. 
98 See reference to the annual general meeting, noted above n 64. 
99 BrewDog’s articles of association, above n 68, article 37.2.  
100 V Fleischer, ‘Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures’ (2006) 104 Michigan Law 
Review 1584. 
101 See above n 63. 
framework available to them. However, their ability to do so asks bigger questions of company law. Of 
course, it is possible that potential investors know full well the risks in making such an investment in 
BrewDog, and are convinced to do so by the branding and the discounts available to them. Legal 
protections for investors cannot, and should not, protect them from bad investment decisions.102 
5. Conclusion 
There are many reasons that individuals could want to be linked to BrewDog. Their branding, 
messaging, and philanthropic investments are highly attractive. The author particularly enjoys the 
product made by BrewDog. If investors want to subscribe for “Equity for Punks Tomorrow” for these 
intangible, non-financial reasons, or even merely for the discount on BrewDog products, then they 
should be able to do so. 
But does law provide sufficient protection for those retail investors who are hoping that BrewDog 
shares will provide a greater financial return on their investment? Perhaps law needs to provide more 
protections for public offerings which are not coupled with the heightened legal and disciplinary effects 
of a capital market. At the moment, this category receive fewer protections, when their need seems 
higher. For whilst an informed individual subscribing for “Equity for Punks Tomorrow” should be 
facilitated in doing so, it will feel as if law has failed if an uninformed retail investor feels like a punk 




102 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 1C(2)(d). 
